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2Abstract
C. Wright Mills called for a truly sociological analysis of actors’
“motive talk,” which decouples the commonsense link between the reasons
actors give for their actions and their mental state prior to those actions.
Subsequent theoretical and empirical work has focused almost entirely on
actors’ retrospective accounting for untoward conduct that has already taken
place. The other aspect of Mills’s program, the reasons actors give for
potentially untoward future conduct and in particular the empirical
investigation of the link between the availability of an acceptable vocabulary
of motives for anticipated conduct and the eventual enactment of that conduct,
has been largely ignored. This article seeks to rehabilitate these lost
dimensions using data from a longitudinal study of mothers’ infant feeding
choices and practices. It examines how mothers account, in advance, for the
possibility that they may eventually feed their babies in ways they consider
suboptimal. Thirty of the thirty-six women interviewed indicated that they
intended to breastfeed, emphasizing the benefits of this practice to their babies.
However, seventeen of these women also anticipated that they might abandon
breastfeeding and presented elaborate accounts of the motives that could lead
them to do so. The findings support Mills’s claim that the availability of an
acceptable vocabulary of motives for untoward conduct increases the
probability that one will engage in such conduct. Mothers who had offered
elaborate anticipatory accounts for abandoning breastfeeding were much more
likely to do so than those who did not offer such accounts.
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3The study of the motives human actors impute to themselves and to
others has a long history in sociology. There has been much debate about the
analytic status of actors’ explanations of conduct. C. Wright Mills’s celebrated
essay, “Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive,” first published in 1940,
is a clearly articulated statement of the “vocabulary of motives” approach to
the analysis of actors’ talk (Mills 1940). Mills was concerned with the motives
actors offer for both past and potential future conduct. However, the
substantial body of theoretical and empirical work stimulated by Mills’s
analysis has largely neglected actors’ motivational talk about possible future
acts, concentrating instead on motives actors ascribe to their past acts.
In this article I seek to rehabilitate this lost, anticipatory dimension of
Mills’s program through an analysis of the “motive talk” (Mills’s term)
produced by women who were pregnant with their first babies. This talk was
elicited during a longitudinal, qualitative interview study of the women’s
infant feeding choices and practices. The data analyzed here are drawn
primarily from the first interview with each woman, which took place shortly
before her baby was born. In these antenatal interviews, most of the women
confirmed their commitment to breastfeeding their babies in line with advice
they had received from health professionals (Murphy 1999). However, many
of them also acknowledged the possibility that they might not be able do so.
They gave various reasons to account for their potential future failure to feed
their babies in ways that they identified as in their babies’ best interests. These
“anticipatory accounts” and their implications for the mothers’ future conduct
are the empirical focus of this article.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MOTIVES
The key feature of Mills’s vocabulary of motives approach is that it
decouples the commonsense link between the reasons actors give for their
actions and the actor’s mental state prior to the act in question. Mills argues
that from a sociological perspective, such motive talk should be analyzed as an
interactional strategy for locating action within the normative framework of
4conduct treated as appropriate or legitimate in a particular group or subgroup.
Motive talk is thus best treated as data on the moral universe within which
actors operate rather than as a conduit to the state of mind of individuals that
leads to particular actions. The analyst’s task, therefore, is to identify the
“integrating, controlling and specifying function a certain type of speech
fulfills in socially situated actions” (Mills 1940:905).
This reorientation in the analysis of motive talk was taken up first by
Sykes and Matza (1957) and then by Scott and Lyman (1963). It has
subsequently informed a wide range of empirical studies of the motives actors
impute to behavior (see, e.g., Dingwall, Eekelaar, and Murray 1985;
Higginson 1999; Kalab 1987; Murphy 1999, 2000; Ray and Simons 1987;
Scully 1990; Scully and Marolla 1984). A number of continuities run from
Mills’s program through much of this later work. First, all these authors focus
on talk in “question” situations (Mills 1940: 905). The data for analysis are the
reasons that actors advance for conduct that is called into question. Scott and
Lyman (1963:47) call such conduct “untoward,” that is, conduct that, in some
sense, is deemed “bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome.” It challenges some valued
norm and gives rise to a charge of either criminal or noncriminal deviance
(Murphy 1999). Thus empirical studies examine the motives convicted
murderers advance for their crimes (Ray and Simons 1987), the excuses and
justifications that teen mothers offer for statutory rape (Higginson 1999), the
accounts students give for absence from class (Kalab 1987), and the ways in
which mothers defend themselves against the charge that their feeding
practices constitute a dereliction of maternal duty (Murphy 2000).
Second, all these authors treat actors’ motive talk as reflecting
the “accepted justifications for present, future, or past programs or acts” (Mills
1940:907) in particular locations and at particular historical periods. Motives
make up the “complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself
or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question” (Weber
1964:98–99). They offer a fertile source of data on the moral and normative
context in which actors live, make decisions, and act. Mills (1940:904) argues
5that “the differing reasons men give for their actions are not themselves
without reasons.” A central question for the sociological analyst is why certain
motives rather than others are verbalized in a given situation or social group.
What are actors doing with their motive talk (Silverman 1985, 1993), and what
light does this throw on the moral and normative context in which such talk is
produced?
Third, all these authors follow Mills in treating motive talk as more
than mere justificatory rhetoric produced by actors to satisfy others who call
them to account. Rather, such talk is part of the interior dialogue with the
“generalized other” (Mead 1934:154) that actors engage in as they consider
the grounds of their own actions. Sykes and Matza (1957) discuss this aspect
of motive talk in relation to juvenile delinquency. They argue that juvenile
delinquents typically share the values of law-abiding society but have
developed a repertoire of justifications for their delinquency. These
“acceptable motives” (Mills 1940) allow them to neutralize or deflect the
disapproval that would otherwise arise from their own internalized norms. As
Mills puts it, “a satisfactory or adequate motive is one that satisfies the
questioners of an act or program, whether it be the other’s or the actor’s” (p.
907).
Although there are many continuities between Mills’s program and that
of later scholars, there are also at least two significant discontinuities. It is
these that concern me here. First, unlike later scholars, both Mills and Sykes
and Matza consider motive talk in relation to future as well as past conduct.
Mills (1940:907) makes this clear when he defines motives as “accepted
justifications for present, future, or past programs or acts.” Such motive talk is
a feature of actors’ interior and exterior dialogue as they deliberate about
possible future courses of action. Dewey (cited in Schutz 1973:63) defined
such deliberation as “a dramatic rehearsal in the imagination of various
competing possible lines of action.” It is, according to Schutz (1973:68),
conducted in the future perfect tense: “In order to project my future action as it
6will roll on I have to place myself in my phantasy at a future time when the
resulting act will already have been materialized” (original emphasis).
Such “retrospection anticipated in phantasy” (Schutz 1973:87) includes
consideration of the “vocabulary of motives” that will be available, at some
future point, to justify one’s actions. Sykes and Matza are even more explicit
about their interest in justifications that precede behavior:
These justifications are commonly described as rationalizations. They
are viewed as following delinquent behavior and as protecting the individual
from self-blame and the blame of others after the act. But there is also good
reason to believe that they precede deviant behavior and make deviant
behavior possible. . . . Disapproval flowing from internalized norms and
conforming others in the social environment is neutralized, turned back or
deflected in advance (1957:666)
This future orientation in the study of motives is related to the second
discontinuity between Mills’s program and that of later theorists and
empirical researchers. Mills (1940:907–8) is centrally concerned with the
relationship between motive talk and subsequent action: “Often anticipations
of acceptable justifications will control conduct. (‘If I did this, what? What
would they say?’) Decisions may be, wholly or in part, delimited by answers
to such queries. . . . Often, if ‘reasons’ were not given, an act would not occur,
nor would diverse actions be integrated.” He calls for empirical investigation
of this relationship between motive talk and subsequent behavior: “It is a
hypothesis worthy and capable of test that typal vocabularies of motive for
different situations are significant determinants of conduct. . . . In this sense
motives are ‘social instruments,’ i.e. data by modifying which the agent will
be able to influence [himself or others]” (p. 908).
The link between the availability of acceptable justifications and
subsequent action is implied in Mead’s (1934:154–56) discussion of the
significance of the “generalized other” in determining conduct: “Complex co-
operative processes and activities and institutional functionings of organized
7human society are also possible only in so far as every individual . . . can take
the general attitudes of all other such individuals . . . and can direct his own
behavior accordingly” emphasis added). Applying Mead’s general principle to
the anticipation of possible future “questioned” or “untoward” conduct, one
would expect that the availability of a repertoire of motives, acceptable to the
“generalized other,” would be crucial in determining whether the individual
embarks on the behavior in question.
Scott and Lyman’s neglect of accounts for possible future action is
understandable. Their focus on the maintenance of social order explains their
preoccupation with retrospective accounts. They were concerned specifically
with how accounts were used to justify or excuse past conduct and the
conditions under which such accounts are honored or rejected as illegitimate.
Nevertheless, this relatively narrow focus has led to the neglect of the
anticipatory dimension of Mills’s program and the failure to examine the links
between vocabularies of motive and action (Campbell 1996). Empirical work
has concentrated on one side of Mills’s agenda (past action) at the expense of
the other (possible future action). In this article I take up Mills’s call to
examine how people anticipate the possibility of future untoward actions and
the extent to which the availability of acceptable justifications and excuses
may encourage or discourage such actions. Before doing so, I consider the
moral and normative context in which first-time mothers anticipate and
practice infant feeding.
THE MORALITY OF MOTHERHOOD AND INFANT FEEDING
Mothers’ talk about infant feeding is situated in the context of
contemporary constructions of motherhood. As both Glenn (1994) and Hays
(1996) have argued, such constructions are both culturally and historically
specific. Hays (1996:21) characterizes the dominant, contemporary ideology
of motherhood as one of “intensive mothering”: “The model of intensive
mothering tells us that children are innocent and priceless, that their rearing
should be carried out primarily by individual mothers and that it should be
8centered upon children’s needs, with methods that are informed by experts,
labor-intensive, and costly.” The child’s needs are seen as taking precedence
over all other considerations (Lawler 2000; Ribbens McCarthy, Edwards, and
Gillies 2000). This ideology calls for mothers who are “richly endowed with
devotion, self-sacrifice and unconditional love” (Hill Collins 1990:116). The
potential consequences for mothers who fail to live up to this ideal are guilt
and self-blame (Bernard 1975).
Infant feeding is one arena in which this ideology of intensive
mothering is played out. As Lupton (1996) argues, the way in which a mother
feeds her baby has become a symbol of her ability generally to care for her
child. For mothers, infant feeding choices are imbued with moral danger
(Lupton 1993; Murphy 1999; Murphy, Parker, and Phipps 1998). New
mothers are subject to a powerful technoscientific discourse that identifies
some choices as risk-laden and others as risk-reducing (Murphy 2000). In
particular, mothers who formula feed rather than breastfeed their babies may
be seen as putting them at risk of serious, even life-threatening dangers,
ranging from sudden infant death syndrome through respiratory and
gastrointestinal disease to poor self-esteem (Ford, Taylor, and Mitchell 1993;
Howie et al. 1990; Lawrence 1995; Saarinen and Kajosaari 1995; Virtanen,
Rasanen, and Aro 1991).
Carter (1995) suggests that failure to breastfeed one’s child lays one
open to the charge of being a poor mother. The decision to breastfeed is easily
aligned with the ideology of intensive mothering and its insistence that
mothers must put their babies’ interests first, whatever the personal cost or
inconvenience (Murphy 1999). Formula feeding is therefore untoward, in the
sense outlined above. I have reported elsewhere (Murphy 1999, 2000) that
mothers who formula feed their babies engage in the kinds of post hoc
accounting talk described by Scott and Lyman. These previous analyses have
followed the conventional line of analyzing how actors account for untoward
conduct retrospectively. In the first case, the focus was on women who
decided in advance that they would formula feed their babies, thus rejecting
9expert advice. The second analysis was concerned with women who had
initially opted to breastfeed their babies but subsequently introduced formula
milk. In the postnatal interviews, these women produced a range of post hoc
accounts to justify or excuse feeding practices that they recognized as
untoward.
In contrast to these earlier analyses, here I consider the accounts
women produced, in advance, for possible future untoward feeding practices.
It focuses particularly on talk related to the problems that the women might
encounter in the future with breastfeeding and the possibility that they might
change from breast to formula milk. This talk about possible future
breastfeeding “failure” offers an opportunity to examine Mills’s arguments
about the links between vocabularies of motives and future action in relation
to empirical data. Such talk is relevant to Mills’s program in a number of
ways. First, it concerns potentially untoward action. In explaining their
decision to breastfeed, these women had outlined the benefits of breastfeeding
in terms of the short-, medium-, and long-term health and welfare of their
babies. In light of their own arguments, any future decision to revert to
formula milk is likely to be an accountable matter. What could legitimate a
mother’s decision to feed her baby in a way that, by her own admission, is
potentially risky?
Second, such talk is concerned with future action. The implementation
of the women’s decision to breastfeed and, by extension, any opportunity to
countermand that decision by formula feeding must necessarily wait until after
the baby is born. At these antenatal interviews, accounting for possible future
untoward action is conducted in the future perfect tense (Schutz 1973). It
involves imagining, in advance, acceptable motives for future untoward
action. What would constitute an adequate defense if the women change to
formula feeding? Accounting for possible future untoward behavior is not as
heavily constrained by actual events or circumstances as post hoc accounting.
Such talk cannot be dismissed as mere justificatory rhetoric. Rather, it is likely
to reflect a “vocabulary of motives” that mothers not only expected to be
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acceptable to others, but that also fits their own normative expectations. Thus
the interview talk throws light on the dialogue the mothers conduct with the
“generalized other,” as well as with “actual others” as they anticipate future,
potentially deviant conduct (Mead 1934:154).
Third, this longitudinal study also allows me to examine the
hypothesis, derived from Mills and Sykes and Matza, that the capacity to
generate accounts that justify or excuse future untoward conduct increases the
probability that such conduct will take place. It is important, however, to note
that this research was not designed to test this hypothesis. Therefore, given
both the relatively small sample size and the number of uncontrolled and
potentially confounding variables, any conclusions will necessarily be
tentative. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider whether the data are
consistent or inconsistent with this hypothesis.
METHODS AND DATA
This study was conducted in Nottingham, England.The author and two
research associates followed a cohort of thirty-six first-time mothers from late
pregnancy until their babies’ second birthdays. Since large-scale U.K. surveys
(see, e.g., Foster, Lader, and Cheeseborough 1997; White, Freeth, and O’Brien
1992) report that infant feeding practices vary according to both occupational
class and the age of the mother, we stratified the sample in respect to these two
variables (see Table 1). We obtained the occupational class profile of National
Health Service general medical practices within a ten-mile radius of
Nottingham by combining data from the 1991 U.K. population census with
information provided by the Family Health Services Authority.1 On the basis
of this information, we selected ten general medical practices with diverse
occupational class profiles and negotiated access to them. The general
practitioners wrote to women on their birth registers who were pregnant with
their first child, enclosing information about the study and inviting them to
discuss participation with the researchers.
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A quota sample of thirty-six mothers, stratified by age and
occupational class, was drawn sequentially from the women who responded to
this invitation. Using the U.K. Registrar General’s classification (Office of
Population Censuses and Surveys 1980), we allocated the women to one of
three occupational class groups on the basis of their own occupation. The
highest group comprised professional workers such as lawyers, teachers,
nurses, and managers. The intermediate group comprised skilled nonmanual
and manual workers such as typists, shop assistants, and technicians. The
lowest group was made up of semiskilled and unskilled workers, including
packers, cleaners, and machine operators. We continued recruitment until we
had filled each cell of the quota sample shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
At the time of the first interview, thirty-two of the thirty-six women
lived with a male partner, including two who shared a home with other
members of that partner’s family. Three women lived with either one or both
of their parents and one lived alone. Twenty-three women were married. Two
of the mothers, one each from the intermediate and lowest class groups, were
members of minority ethnic groups. One of these was African Caribbean, and
the other was South Asian. Fifteen women had received some postcompulsory
education, and seven of these had attended college or university.
We carried out six qualitative interviews with each woman, one before
the birth of her child and five at fixed intervals over the subsequent two years,
yielding a total of 216 interviews.2 We conducted these interviews in the
women’s homes between 1995 and 1998. Each interview lasted from one to
two hours. The interviews of thirty-three of the women were tape recorded and
fully transcribed. At their request, we did not record interviews with the other
three women but took detailed notes and wrote these up fully immediately
afterward. When asked at the antenatal interview, thirty women declared an
intention to breastfeed and six to formula feed.
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For the purposes of initial analysis, we selected a subsample of twelve
women, reflecting variations in age, occupational class, and feeding outcomes.
We subjected interview transcripts for this subsample to detailed inductive
analysis. Each investigator produced written reports on the transcripts she had
examined in detail. These identified emerging themes and categories. We
discussed the emerging analysis in weekly meetings, where these reports were
compared and contrasted. On the basis of these discussions, we developed a
coding framework. We specified operational definitions of codes and
incorporated them into a coding handbook. We then applied this coding
framework to the interview data from all thirty-six informants. We discussed
the difficulties of applying the framework to the data at further meetings and
amended the coding handbook to take account of data that did not fit the
framework derived from the first twelve cases. We then applied the revised
coding framework to all the interviews.
FINDINGS
The data presented here are drawn from antenatal interviews with the
thirty women who declared an intention to breastfeed. All the women
interviewed for this study reported having received extensive information
about the advantages of breastfeeding and the disadvantages of formula
feeding before their babies were born. This information was given them at
regular clinic appointments throughout their pregnancies and at antenatal
classes, usually held in the last trimester of pregnancy. They were encouraged
to offer their babies nothing but breast milk for at least four months.3 The
women also reported having received leaflets and other literature stressing the
benefits of breastfeeding.
As reported elsewhere (Murphy 1999), these women were able,
without difficulty, to represent their decision to breastfeed as evidence of good
motherhood.4 However, in the course of the antenatal interviews, almost all
the women raised the possibility that problems might arise with breastfeeding
after the birth, leading them to formula feed their babies instead. Such
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anticipation of the possibility of breastfeeding “failure” (a term that these
women used to describe a shift to formula feeding) is realistic. Large-scale
U.K. government surveys show that while nearly three quarters of first-time
mothers initiate breastfeeding, only a quarter are still breastfeeding at four
months (the minimum recommended period) (Foster, Lader, and
Cheeseborough 1997). The anticipation of failure turned out to be well
founded in the cohort of women interviewed for this study. Of the thirty
women who initiated breastfeeding, 43 percent had introduced formula by the
time their babies were four weeks old and 57 percent had done so by eight
weeks after the birth.5
The Form and Content of Anticipatory Accounts
I refer to the form and content of the women’s talk about possible
future breastfeeding failure as “anticipatory accounts” to distinguish it from
the retrospective accounts discussed by Scott and Lyman (1963). Such
accounts are anticipatory insofar as they concern untoward conduct that has
not yet taken place and that, indeed, the women present as unlikely to occur.
They are examples of Schutz’s (1973:87) “retrospection anticipated in
phantasy.” In particular, I consider the extent to which these anticipatory
accounts resemble those analyzed by Scott and Lyman.
Scott and Lyman distinguished between two major categories
of accounts: excuses and justifications. Excuses acknowledge that the act in
question is wrong but offer reasons why the actor should not be held
responsible for it. Justifications accept that the actor was responsible but argue
that, contrary to appearances, the act was not wrong. As the women
anticipated future breastfeeding failure, they incorporated both excuses and
justifications into their talk. They considered the possibility of future untoward
conduct (a change to formula feeding) and rehearsed the motives that they
might, at a future date, advance to defend such conduct. The following
extended excerpt demonstrates the complex way in which excuses and
justifications were woven into the same account.
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And I would really like to persevere with it. However, I’m gonna be
realistic and if it becomes a real problem, and an issue, I think it’s important
for me and the baby to be happy about the type of feeding that we’re doing,
and if it doesn’t suit the baby and it doesn’t suit me and I’m not happy with it,
the baby won’t be happy, so I’m not fanatical about it. . . . Although I know
it’s best and I’m really going to give it a good go, if it doesn’t work out I
won’t feel it’s the end of the world. . . . I think it’s yet another pressure for
Mums towards “This is the best way for your baby” and I know it is, and from
what everyone says, but it may be the best nutritionally . . . but it’s not always
the best practically for the mother and psychologically and everything else. . . .
It’s got to be right for you and the baby. (Eva, Older, Highest)6
On the one hand, Eva accepts that breastfeeding is the nutritionally
superior option and proceeds to show how any future failure to breastfeed
could be explained by factors beyond her control. Scott and Lyman would
categorize this as an excuse. Eva accepts that formula feeding would be
regrettable but excuses it in advance on the grounds that it would not result
from lack of willpower. She intends to “really going to give it a good go”.
However, she anticipates that even this might not be enough. In spite of her
best efforts, breastfeeding could become “a real problem” and “an issue.”
On the other hand, Eva’s talk also contains justifications. She defends
formula feeding by setting the nutritional benefits of breastfeeding in the
context of the baby’s broader welfare. If she does formula feed, it will be
justified because of her need to balance the baby’s nutritional well-being
against other important factors, including psychological ones. It is important
that both she and the baby are happy with the type of feeding adopted. The
reference to her own happiness takes her into potentially tricky moral territory.
In the context of dominant ideologies of intensive mothering, asserting her
own needs risks undermining her claim to responsible motherhood. However,
she overcomes this by presenting her own welfare as indivisible from her
child’s. If she is not happy with breastfeeding, her child will not be. She
acknowledges that “everyone says” that breastfeeding will provide the best
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nutrition for her baby, but she challenges the notion that it is crucial for
establishing a good mother-baby relationship.
Scott and Lyman identified a number of subcategories of excuses and
justifications used in retrospective accounts. We found almost all of these in
the women’s anticipatory accounts. Table 2 presents a summary of the
subcategories invoked by these women, along with an indication of how they
were applied to the possibility of future formula feeding.
[Table 2 about here]
Excuses
The four subcategories of excuses identified by Scott and Lyman
(1963) were “appeals to accidents,” “appeals to defeasibility,” “appeals to
biological drives,” and “scapegoating.” The first refers to “the generally
recognized hazards of the environment, the understandable inefficiency of the
body, and the human incapacity to control all motor responses” (p. 47). This
excuse was common in the women’s anticipatory accounts. They appealed to
the “well-known fact” that not every woman who wants to, succeeds in
breastfeeding her baby. For example, Barbara said: “I’m hoping to breastfeed.
I’m hoping to because not everybody can take to breastfeeding” (Older,
Intermediate).
Appeals to accidents often concerned either the quantity or the quality
of the milk that the women’s bodies would produce and linked this to the
possible future need to change to formula milk.
If my milk wasn’t strong enough for the baby or it wasn’t good enough
or whatever. . . . I’m not saying I won’t bottle feed. . . . I mean obviously if I
can’t produce the amount of milk that the baby needs I’m gonna have to
anyway. (Bryony, Younger, Lowest)
The women emphasized their babies’ needs. They anticipated the
possibility that their bodies would prove inefficient at milk production. If this
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turned out to be the case, it should not be interpreted as their fault. The
decision to introduce formula would be imposed on them. It would constitute
an “understandable inefficiency of the body.” Such appeals to accidents were
bolstered by stories of friends who had found that breast milk did not satisfy
their babies. For example: “I mean, my friend, she’s just had a little boy. He’s
what six weeks old, but she can’t breastfeed for some reason. It don’t satisfy
him enough” (Bryony, Younger, Lowest).
Scott and Lyman’s second category of excuses, “defeasibility,”
refers to the possibility that either the actor was not fully informed or that his
or her will was not entirely free. Given that the women discussed here had
linked their intention to breastfeed to a commitment to act in their babies’ best
interest, it would be difficult for them to plead ignorance. However, many
were at pains to point out that they would only introduce formula milk in
response to some constraint outside their control. In that sense, they could
argue that they were not acting freely, and they continued to emphasize their
commitment to breastfeeding:
I think if I could personally I would breastfeed . . . and I would stick
with it through the difficult weeks, I think. (Helen, Older, Highest)
The more I read about it, the more I want to do it, and I think I’ll be
really, really disappointed if I have problems and I can’t. I’ll be really, really
disappointed. (Ella, Older, Intermediate)
Here the women can be seen as defending themselves in advance
against the potential charge that changing to formula milk would reflect a lack
of commitment or willpower. Once again, these appeals to defeasibility are
strengthened by references to others whose commitment to breastfeeding was
defeated by circumstances beyond their control. Barbara presents herself as a
sensible, well-informed woman who understands that secure prediction of the
future is not possible:
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I’ve known too many people say, “Oh, yeah, I’m only giving my baby
breast milk,” and you find that they reckon two or three days later that they
just couldn’t do it. The baby just couldn’t take the milk or couldn’t take the
breast at all. So obviously you’ve got to keep an open mind. . . . You never
know what’s round the corner. Nobody can predict the future. (Older,
Intermediate) Scott and Lyman’s third category of excuses, “scapegoating,”
entails the claim that the questioned behavior is a response to the behavior or
attitudes of another. The person giving the account accepts that the conduct in
question was unfortunate but attributes the blame to someone else. Once again
this kind of reasoning arose in the interviews, as the women anticipated the
possibility of breastfeeding “failure.” They identified lack of support as a
possible reason for turning to formula milk: “Some people I felt perhaps
haven’t really had the support that perhaps could have helped them succeed”
(Sarah, Younger, Intermediate). At times health professionals were seen as the
potential culprits:
There’d better be a lot of people willing to back me up, have patience
with me, and really try to help me out. I hope so because then I’ll think, Well,
I’m not surprised people bottle feed. . . I’ll be extremely disappointed. I’ll be
very annoyed as well, because of the, they foist all this on to you and they say,
“Well, you know it’s really good for the baby.”. . . . I don’t want to give up at
the first hurdle and not having anybody there saying, “Try a different way,”
you know. (Dilys, Older, Intermediate)
There were references to friends whose unfortunate experiences with
health professionals had been associated with their decision to discontinue
breastfeeding:
My friend . . . they gave her this baby and said, “Feed it,” and she says
she felt a bit pushed into it with the midwives all pulling her about and saying,
“No, you are doing it wrong and you know you’ve got to do it like this,” and
she said she’d rather have just been left alone. (Ella, Younger, Lowest)
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Family members were also implicated. One woman criticized those
who failed to grasp the importance of others’ contributions to breastfeeding
success.
They haven’t really looked at why mums as individuals have chosen
what they have done. . . . [T]hey haven’t had a lot of support from their
husbands. . . . [Y]ou need an awful lot of support and I think everything should
be taken into account with feeding, not just looking at breast is best. (Eva,
Older, Highest)
Scapegoating was also applied to the babies themselves. They were
granted considerable agency in the mothers’ talk in terms of the possibility
that their babies might refuse to cooperate. Babies were seen as having
preferences in relation to feeding: “I’ve got the patience and I’m going to
persevere and I think, Well . . . if I can’t do it . . . if the baby don’t want to, I’ll
go on to a bottle” (Renée, Older, Lowest). One woman described her friend’s
experience: “Ten weeks into her baby’s developing he sort of began to refuse
her breast and was playing around and wasn’t being satisfied so she introduced
a bottle” (Eva, Older Highest).
Scott and Lyman’s fourth and final subcategory of excuses,
“biological drives,” refers to the “invocation of the body and its processes.”
There was just one example of this kind of reasoning in the interview data.
Belinda described the way in which her intentions in relation to infant feeding
had changed during her pregnancy. To begin with, she had been adamantly
opposed to breastfeeding. Gradually she had come around to idea that she
would try it. She related this shift to the influence of hormonal changes during
pregnancy. She presented herself as the kind of person who was at the mercy
of these biological processes:
I suffered with PMT, and I’d get these moods . . . and I’ve . . . decided
I’m gonna do something and said, you know, that’s it. I’m gonna do this just
to be awkward . . . [W]hen I was not very well at the beginning I said I’m not
gonna breastfeed. . . . I was in that mood, where I don’t care what anybody
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else says, I’m not being a cow . . . but now because me hormones and all that
have changed and I’m quite a nice person at the moment . . . and I’m thinking,
well, you can give it a go, . . . so I think it was only me body was changing. I
got this attitude, well bugger this, I’m saying what I’m doing. (Older, Lowest)
Here Belinda suggests that any decision she makes about breastfeeding
in the present or the future will be the outcome of forces beyond her control.
Just as shifts in her biological and hormonal status have led to the decision to
breastfeed, so another shift could make that decision impossible to sustain.
Justifications
At first glance, it might seem that justificatory accounts for future
formula feeding would be more difficult to sustain than excuses. Justifications
involve the assertion that, contrary to first impressions, an act should not be
judged wrong. Given that all these women had grounded their intention to
breastfeed in a commitment to do the best for their babies, it is perhaps
difficult to see how they could escape the negative evaluation of formula
feeding in the future. In fact, these women’s anticipatory accounts drew on
four of Scott and Lyman’s six subcategories of justification. The two absent
subcategories were “denial of the victim” and “self-fulfillment.” The former
involves a claim that the supposed victim deserved the injury either because
(s)he has injured the actor or because (s)he occupies a normatively discrepant
or stigmatized role. The latter presents an act as justifiable because it promotes
the self-fulfillment of the actor. The neglect of these two types of justification
in relation to infant feeding is hardly surprising. To invoke either would
involve challenging dominant images in contemporary society—of innocent
childhood, on the one hand, and of selfless motherhood, on the other.
The other four subcategories of justification were widely represented in
the women’s talk as they anticipated the possibility that they might abandon
breastfeeding. Perhaps surprisingly, the type of justification most commonly
invoked was “denial of injury.” This involves the claim that the act in question
was permissible because no one was in fact injured by it. Given that the
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women routinely explained their intention to breastfeed in terms of the
nutritional benefits to their babies, it may seem strange that they could
reconcile this with the claim that formula feeding would not harm their child.
They used a number of strategies to do so. The first of these was a tempering
of the claims that breast milk is the nutritionally superior option. The
following examples illustrate this.
Although they do say breast is best, but I also think, well, bottle milk
has got to be near, near enough as good as, else they wouldn’t provide it.
(Bryony, Younger, Lowest)
Probably it gets, gets certain things it doesn’t get in the milk, powdered
milk . . . yeah I do believe that breast milk must you know be good for the
baby . . . yeah but then again I don’t think bottle-fed babies are any worse off
really. (Belinda, Older, Lowest)
Though these women generally present health professionals as experts
on infant feeding, a certain skepticism about professional assertions of the
benefits of breastfeeding is also evident. For example, one woman said:
At the moment they seem to be like they’re all for breastfeeding,
everything you read is sort of like, “you should breastfeed because it’s better
for your baby.” . . . I mean there must be some bad points about that as well
you . . . and they don’t tell you how good it [formula milk] is for them and you
know. (Ella, Younger, Lowest)
In minimizing the potential risk of formula milk to babies, the women
mention babies who are fed formula but are healthy nevertheless:
But you know they’re [friends’ babies who are formula fed] doing very
well so I don’t know, my mum didn’t breastfeed any of us and she’s always
saying, “You’re all right. You’ve always got on all right.” (Carol, Younger,
Intermediate)
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I mean I was bottle fed and my sisters were bottle fed and obviously
millions of people are bottle fed and it doesn’t seem to affect them so I don’t
think it would have any particular effect if the baby was bottle fed but I’d just
like to give it a go and see how I get on really. (Sally, Younger, Highest)
Often the women’s denials of injury incorporated a variation on
another of Scott and Lyman’s subcategories of justifications, the “appeal to
loyalty.” This involves the claim that the act in question was appropriate
because it served the interests of someone to whom the actor owed an
unbreakable allegiance. Scott and Lyman assume that in such appeals to
loyalty the injured person will be different from the person to whom the actor
owes allegiance. The women adopted a parallel logic in their anticipatory
accounts, but in this case the victim and the person to whom they owe
allegiance were the same. Thus they conflated the “denial of injury” and
“appeal to loyalties” subcategories of justification. They claimed that the
nutritional benefits of breast milk had to be weighed against other aspects of
the baby’s welfare. At times attention to these other aspects might require the
mother to subordinate breastfeeding to the baby’s other needs. This kind of
reasoning is illustrated in the following extract:
I don’t want to keep on trying if it’s not going to work. I would rather
just say “No, it’s not going to happen” and go straight on to a bottle and then
everybody is happy. . . . I will be a lot more relaxed knowing the baby is
actually going to get a substantial feed and probably the baby is going to be a
lot more, I mean if it seems to be sucking away and it can’t get anything then
it’s going to get distressed isn’t it. I’d rather think about the baby than what is
actually right. . . . I’d rather think about what the baby wants than what other
people have said to me. . . . If they are hungry all the time, it might just be
better to change to a bottle and give them a bit more. (Daphne, Older,
Intermediate)
Here the mother is stressing her responsibility to consider the baby’s
welfare in the broadest sense rather than focusing narrowly on the comparative
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benefits of breast over formula milk. Her loyalty is to the baby rather than to
doctrinaire ideas about what is right. Any future decision to formula feed will
be made in the best interests of the baby, ensuring that she or he is happy and
gets ’a substantial feed’..
The appeals to loyalty frequently involved references to a symbiotic
relationship between mother and baby. As noted above, any suggestion that
mothers might at some future point change to formula feeding could be
viewed as evidence of selfishness on the mother’s part. In the context of
contemporary child-centered ideologies of intensive mothering, this would put
the mother in moral danger (Lupton 1993:425). However, the women
interviewed here consistently presented any negative feelings they might
experience about breastfeeding in terms of their on the child. Thus, they
argued, any decision to give up breastfeeding at some future date would be
based on the best interests of the child. The following extract demonstrates
how women integrated their own preferences with loyalty to the child:
Bottle feeding leads to this that and the other and you wonder why they
bottle feed at all really from the way they tell it but I don’t think I’d feel
pressured into doing anything I don’t feel happy with because I think if you’re
not happy with it then your baby would sense that you’re not happy about [it]
and that could cause maybe even worse problems than using a bottle. (Sally,
Younger, Highest)
In such talk, the women invoke a holistic view of the baby’s needs in
defense of any future use of formula milk. They imply that while a narrow
view might assume that breastfeeding is always in the best interests of the
child, a more holistic view is that a child has a number of needs, including the
need for a stress-free environment. As a result, they are able to recast acts that
could be interpreted as selfish (mothers putting their own preferences first) in
terms of protecting the baby from more serious problems. As such, loyalty to
the baby would sometimes involve resisting the call to breastfeed at all costs.
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Some women also engaged in the practice that Scott and Lyman label
“condemning the condemners.” This kind of justification involves the claim
that although a particular act was unfortunate, it pales into insignificance when
contrasted to worse acts committed by others that go uncondemned. The
women usually directed this condemnation at either health professionals or
other breastfeeding mothers. In the first case, health professionals were
accused of causing problems through the inflexible championing of
breastfeeding at all costs.
[I]f you do have a baby that’s not satisfied in hospital they won’t let
you give a top up feed with a bottle. . . . [I]t’s a sad thing if a mother is
struggling in hospital they’re not allowed to give a top up bottle. . . . I think
that if too much pressure is put on a mum to breastfeed and she doesn’t
succeed she feels a failure and she doesn’t only feel a failure in feeding, she
feels a failure as a mother and as a person. (Eva, Older, Highest)
Doctrinaire commitment to breastfeeding is seen as damaging the
delicate relationship between mother and baby by undermining the mother’s
self-esteem and self-confidence. Those who adopt such a position are
themselves deemed worthy of condemnation. This, Eva suggests, is likely to
be much more problematic than the effects of formula feeding. Later in the
interview, Eva suggested that health professionals and policy makers are
driven by motives other than the welfare of individual babies:
I think there’s a lot of pressure from the School of Midwifery, from the
School of Nursing, to pass this on and the pressure comes from government
level and works its way right down. . . . [T]hey had a meeting on how they
could improve their breastfeeding figures, you know, and it’s like everything
else is forgotten about and the whole issue is “get these figures up” you know
and they haven’t really looked at why the mums as individuals have chosen to
do what they have done.
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Other breastfeeding mothers were also criticized for intransigent
commitment to breastfeeding at all costs, one woman related that she felt an
acquaintance had put her baby’s health at risk:
There’s another family I know and she was quite an older mum … the
last of five were twins and really sort of one of the twins was really quite runty
and she wouldn’t hear of it to top up with a bottle or anything and was so
adamant about this breastfeeding and like I feel personally to the detriment of
the child. (Sarah, Younger, Intermediate)
Here the suggestion is that the good mother is one who recognizes
when breastfeeding is not working out and is prepared to change her plans in
response to the baby’s needs. Later in the interview, the same mother
suggested that breastfeeding could be very “self-indulgent” insofar as it would
involve having “this little thing totally dependent upon me.”
The final subcategory of justifications found in these data is “sad
tales,” “a selected (often distorted) arrangement of facts that highlight an
extremely dismal past, and thus ‘explain’ the individual’s present state” (Scott
and Lyman 1963:52). As we have seen, the women frequently described the
experiences of friends or relations who had found themselves unable to
continue breastfeeding in the face of overwhelming problems. They also
described their own experiences during pregnancy and framed these as a
reason that it might become impossible to sustain breastfeeding. For example,
one woman, who declared herself “definitely pro-breastfeeding,” nevertheless
said,
I don’t know whether it’s the feeding in public and stuff that worries
me or if I just think I’m going to get really fed up of not having my own body
back sort of thing. Because you’ve still got worries about what you’re eating
and keeping up with the healthy diet . . . when you’ve been pregnant nine
months and you have to worry about all these things. I’m just dying to get my
own body back and know that I can eat that and not worry about it or drink
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that and not worry about it . . . [I]t’s always been at the back of my mind that
I’ll probably switch to bottle feeding. (Carol, Younger, Intermediate)
Other women imagined possible scenarios that could overwhelm their
commitment to breastfeeding. It is perhaps here that Schutz’s retrospection
anticipated in phantasy is most evident in the women’s anticipatory accounts.
One woman, who insisted that she would “really like to persevere,”
nevertheless projected an imagined set of circumstances, beyond her power to
control, that would make it too difficult to breastfeed.
If breastfeeding, if you’re have engorgement problems, if your nipples
are very sore and cracked, . . . if you’re being woken, if the baby’s not
satisfied with the breast and you’re being, you know two hourly feeding[s]
twenty-four hours a day, not getting any sleep. You’re slightly anemic
yourself, you’re trying to cope with the psychological changes in your life and
the physical changes that motherhood brings, you’re not getting on with the
breastfeeding and you feel a bit of a failure, all that sort of thing, and I think if
the baby’s really not happy, not, you know, not gaining weight, if you’re not
too well, you’ve had a cesarean section and your milk’s not coming through as
it should, I think all these things would push me towards bottle feeding. (Eva,
Older woman, Highest)
As this mother heaps problem upon problem, she makes it difficult to
deny the claim that someone in such a situation would be justified in turning to
formula feeding.
Women Who Did Not Offer Anticipatory Accounts
Of the thirty women who declared an intention to breastfeed when
interviewed before their babies were born, seventeen offered elaborated
anticipatory accounts of the kind discussed above. As we have seen, these
accounts were very similar in form and function to the retrospective accounts
analyzed by Scott and Lyman (1963). A further five women made much more
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truncated statements to the effect that their commitment to breastfeeding might
be thwarted in some way. Examples are as follows;
You know, try it out and if I couldn’t get on with it I’d revert to a
bottle. (Trudy, Older, Lowest)
I’d like to breastfeed if I can . . . it really depends on whether that’s
going to be possible. If it’s physically possible and it’s not too uncomfortable,
then I will obviously try and do that. (Elaine, Older, Highest)
Though such statements imply the possibility that the women’s
attempts to breastfeed may be obstructed by factors beyond their control, they
are not “worked up” into excuses or justifications in the same way as the more
elaborated anticipatory accounts discussed in the previous section. They
simply accept the possibility of failure in the future without trying to elaborate
a defense for such failure.
The remaining eight women differed insofar as they did not anticipate
future failure to breastfeed in their interview talk. Of these, just one woman,
Christine, was very optimistic about the ease of breastfeeding: “I just decided
before I got pregnant that if I had a child I would breastfeed. . . . I don’t
foresee any problems. I just hope there won’t be any” (Younger, Highest). The
other seven women discussed the potential problems associated with
breastfeeding, often at considerable length, but did not present these as
grounds for abandoning breastfeeding. For some, this was because their
personal circumstances were seen as protective in some way. For example, one
woman said, “But there are very few reasons why women can’t breastfeed
apparently. . . . As I’m going back to my parents after I’ve had the baby, I
won’t be in a stressful environment and I’m sure we’ll get it right eventually
. . . As they say, “practice makes perfect,” so we’ll get there in the end. I don’t
even think it’s going to be hard, but I mean it might be” (Emma, Older,
Intermediate).
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Other women identified problems but offered solutions that would
prevent a breakdown in breastfeeding. For example, one woman
acknowledged the difficulties associated with breastfeeding but pitted these
against her determination and the assistance she would receive from health
professionals:
“I’m told this is quite a difficult thing to do. . . . I think it would be
worthwhile whatever it takes. . . . I really want to give it a go and I think that’s
one of the hurdles. I’ve got a few friends that have recently had babies and
they’re telling me how difficult it is to get a baby to feed at the breast and all
that but I think that if you’re determined with the help of the midwife or the
health visitor and whatever you should be able to get there” (Diane, Older,
Highest).
Like the women who invoked anticipatory accounts, this woman
referred to the experience of friends. However, unlike those women, she
rejected her friends’ failure as irrelevant. The implication was that these
friends lacked the commitment to breastfeeding that would ensure her own
success.
Some of the problems these women identified related to possible breast
soreness. For example, one said, “I’ve got a friend who started breastfeeding
and got a load of problems with mastitis and stuff so that made me start
thinking. . . . The idea of being really sore worries me, but you know I’ve
heard that it’s a lot to do with actually positioning and getting things
established right in the first place” (Rosemary, Younger, Highest). Thus this
woman too identified a potential problem but offered a solution. Other
problems discussed related to the demands that breastfeeding makes on the
mother’s time and energy. Again, these problems were acknowledged but
dismissed as relatively insignificant.
I feel quite relaxed about that, not worried that feeding can be time-
consuming. (Tracey, Older, Highest)
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I mean the main problem is just tiredness and the fact that if the baby
wants to feed sort of every two hours for over the first three or four months
that’s gonna be tiring, . . . so if it means that I’m sleeping at strange times you
know then I think I would, I’d rather fit in with the baby’s pattern as much as I
can. (Rosemary, Younger, Highest)
Breastfeeding was also with associated an unequal division of labor,
with social isolation for the mother and with potential exclusion for the father.
Julia discussed these possibilities but also described how she would minimize
the negative impact on both herself and her partner: “I suddenly realized. I
mean Charlie [baby’s father]7 is really into it, and I suddenly thought, well, of
course, he would be because it’s going to be me who gets up in the night. I
thought about stuff like going out in the evenings, things like that. . . . But I
intend, as early as possible, to start expressing and giving it bottles of breast
milk so that Charlie can have that but also so that hopefully I can get out a bit
in the evenings and stuff like that” (Julia, Older Highest).
Although these women cited the negative experiences of friends,
unlike those who offered anticipatory accounts, they did not use these as a
rationale for formula feeding.
A friend of mine had said that was one of the reasons she wasn’t going
to breastfeed because it would exclude her husband from feeding the baby but
I don’t feel that way because you can express your milk and it can go in a
bottle and he can feed the baby. . . . One of my friends said that she felt like a
cow so . . . they feel that their life wasn’t their own, they couldn’t go anywhere
which wasn’t, they couldn’t go out or anything because they’d got to
breastfeed, and like I say, until I actually try it I don’t really know how I will
feel, but I think in my mind that I want to breastfeed and I think that’s half the
battle. (Diane, Older, Highest)
A number of women recognized the heavy burden that would fall to
them as a result of breastfeeding. However, they also said they would find
ways to alleviate the burden and did not present this as a legitimate reason for
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formula feeding. They also anticipated difficulty and embarrassment feeding
their babies in front of others but downplayed the significance of this.
I’m not sure how I’ll feel about breastfeeding in public. I don’t think
it’s any big thing at the moment. I think things are much easier than they were
even a few years ago, so in that sense I’m not particularly worried. (Tracey,
Older, Highest)
I think if it [feeding in public] is a problem it will be a problem I want
to get over. (Rosemary, Younger, Highest)
With the exception of Christine, all these eight women anticipated that
breastfeeding would be challenging in a range of ways. They did not take
success for granted. However, they differed from those who offered
anticipatory accounts in that they did not present such difficulties as grounds
for formula feeding. They were, rather, presented as challenges to be
overcome and the women often identified the strategies that they would use to
do so.
Linking Talk to Action
Mills called for the empirical investigation of the relationship between
motive talk and subsequent action. Although this study was not designed to
test hypotheses, its longitudinal design allows us to consider whether the data
are consistent with the claim that the generation of an acceptable vocabulary
of motives for future untoward conduct increases the probability that one will
engage in such conduct. Such a claim would be supported if the mothers who
engaged in anticipatory accounting were more likely to abandon breastfeeding
before the four-month threshold after their babies’ births than those who did
not.
The feeding behaviors of the thirty women who declared an intention
to breastfeed in the interviews conducted before their babies were born are
shown in Table 3. The behaviors are displayed according to whether the
women offered elaborated anticipatory accounts, truncated accounts, or no
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accounts at all. These data are consistent with the claim that women who offer
elaborated anticipatory accounts will be more likely to give up breastfeeding at
an early stage. Of the seventeen women who offered elaborated anticipatory
accounts, ten (59%) had ceased breastfeeding by four weeks after their babies’
births and seventeen (100%) by sixteen weeks after the births. The comparable
figures for women who did not offer any anticipatory accounts are one
(12.5%) at four and two at sixteen weeks after the birth. The one woman in
this group who had given up breastfeeding by four weeks was Christine, who
differed from the other women who did not offer anticipatory accounts insofar
as she dismissed difficulties or problems with breastfeeding at the antenatal
interview. Conversely, six of the eight women (75%) who did not offer
anticipatory accounts continued to breastfeed their babies up to and beyond the
sixteen-week threshold, compared to none of those who offered anticipatory
accounts.
[Table 3 about here]
The practices of the women who offered truncated anticipatory
accounts are somewhat more mixed, with two (40%) giving up breastfeeding
by four weeks and the remaining three (60%) continuing to breastfeed beyond
the sixteen-week threshold. The numbers are very small here, and it is not
possible to draw even tentative conclusions about the relationship between
truncated anticipatory accounts and future behavior.
One possible confounding factor, which cannot be fully teased out
here, is that of occupational class. We know from large-scale surveys that
women in nonmanual occupations are more likely to breastfeed for a longer
time than are those in manual occupations (Foster, Lader, and Cheeseborough
1997). That was also the case in this study: 50 percent of the women in the
highest occupational class grouping breastfed their babies beyond the four-
month threshold, compared to just 25 percent of women in the intermediate
class grouping and none at all in the lowest grouping. The distribution of
anticipatory accounts by occupational class is shown in Table 4.
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[Table 4 about here]
Of the eight women who did not offer anticipatory accounts, five were
in the highest and three in the intermediate class groups. This means that all
women from the lowest occupational class grouping offered anticipatory
accounts. This suggests that readiness to offer anticipatory accounts could be
inversely related to occupational class. However, the group of women who did
offer anticipatory accounts includes women from all occupational class groups
(highest: 4; intermediate: 6; lowest: 7), suggesting that such accounting
practices are not confined to particular occupational classes.
CONCLUSION
I have considered how individual actors dealt with the possibility that
they might, in the foreseeable future, engage in conduct that they themselves
identified as untoward. The women in this study recognized that any future
introduction of formula milk into their babies’ diets would lay them open to
the charge that they were failing to meet their maternal obligation to put their
babies’ interests first. As the women took “the attitude of the other” (Mead
1934:179) to such potentially untoward behavior, they anticipated the
disapproval of their community. Mead argues that when actors seek to side-
step the disapproval of their communities (and hence of self), they must find a
way to “speak the voice of reason” to themselves (p. 168). Individuals find it
difficult to go against the morality of their community to the extent of
engaging in activities that would be condemned. However, as Mead points out,
individuals are not simply bound by community morality (pp. 168 ff.). Rather,
they are engaged in a conversation in which they bring up the attitude of the
community toward themselves, respond to those attitudes, and thereby
possibly change the attitude of the group (p.180). The anticipatory accounts,
which many of the women produced, represent a powerful means of “speaking
back,” not only to actual others who may question their behavior, but also to
the generalized other of their community and, hence, to self. In doing so, they
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may, literally, be making such untoward behavior “thinkable” and, as a result,
“do-able.”
Much sociological analysis of what Mills called “motive talk” has
focused on the ways in which actors account for untoward behavior in which
they have already engaged. This has been at the expense of other aspects of
Mills’s agenda. In this article I have opened up a neglected aspect of Mills’s
program by examining vocabularies of motive that are employed in relation to
future action. I have investigated empirically the claim, put forward initially
by Mills (1940) and subsequently by Sykes and Matza (1957), that accounts
may precede as well as follow action. I have shown how such anticipatory
accounts not only occur but also bear a strong resemblance in form and
content to the post hoc repair work that actors use to defend past conduct.
I have also examined, somewhat more tentatively given the evidence
available to me, Mills’s argument that the availability of acceptable
vocabularies of motive for untoward conduct is linked to the enactment of
such conduct. It is important here to distinguish between two possible
interpretations of Mills’s position. First, there is what we might call the
“weak” version of Mills’s argument, in which the ability to generate
acceptable vocabularies of motive for future untoward conduct increases the
probability that such conduct will be enacted. This is suggested by Mills’s
(1940:907) statement “Often, if ‘reasons’ were not given, an act would not
occur.” Certainly these data lend support to this version of Mills’s argument.
As we have seen, women who produced anticipatory accounts in the antenatal
interviews were much more likely to cease breastfeeding earlier than
recommended. All of the women who produced elaborated anticipatory
accounts ceased breastfeeding early, compared to just 31 percent of those who
did not produce such accounts. There is then, at least in these data, evidence of
a relationship between anticipatory accounting and the enactment of untoward
conduct.
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The second and stronger interpretation of Mills’s position is that
anticipatory accounting is a necessary condition of untoward conduct. This
appears to be implied by Mills’s description of acceptable vocabularies of
motive as “determinants of conduct” (p. 908). Our findings offer less support
for this strong version of Mills’s argument. If anticipatory accounts are a
necessary condition of early cessation of breastfeeding, how are we to account
for the four women who did not offer such accounts and yet gave up
breastfeeding before the recommended four-month threshold? Do these
women undermine the claim that acceptable vocabularies of motive are a
necessary condition of untoward conduct? Certainly that is one possibility.
However, the limitations of the data presented here require us to exercise
caution in dismissing too readily this stronger version of Mills’s position. We
need to consider whether there are any possible explanations for these four
negative cases that are compatible with Mills’s argument.
There are a number of possible explanations here. It could be, for
example, that these four women had acceptable vocabularies of motive
available to them when interviewed antenatally but simply did not articulate
them. This might be particularly likely in the case of the two women who
offered truncated anticipatory accounts. With a little more encouragement, or
in a different interactional context, they might well have worked these up into
more elaborated versions. We cannot assume that the failure to articulate
anticipatory accounts in the course of an interview indicates the
nonavailability of such accounts. Alternatively, given the time that elapsed
between the antenatal interviews and actual cessation of breastfeeding, it is
possible that new vocabularies of motive became available to these women
before they introduced formula milk. Either or both of these possibilities are
compatible with supporting the stronger version of Mills’s argument.
Unfortunately, the data reported here do not allow us to examine these
possibilities more fully.
On the other hand, even if all the women who introduced formula milk
had articulated anticipatory accounts, we would still need to exercise some
34
caution before treating this as evidence of a causal link. It is of course possible
that both the availability of anticipatory accounts and the early cessation of
breastfeeding are causally related to other factors such as occupational class
and low social capital. That women in the lowest occupational class groupings
were both more likely to articulate elaborated accounts and to cease
breastfeeding early lends some support to this possibility.
Despite these reservations, our findings suggest that Mills’s hypothesis
that the availability of an acceptable vocabulary of motives for anticipated
untoward conduct promotes such conduct warrants further investigation. A
program of future research might incorporate a number of elements. It could,
for example, investigate the use of anticipatory accounts in relation to other
kinds of noncriminal and criminal deviance. My analysis has been constrained
by the uneven distribution of accounting practices in a sample that was
designed for other purposes. In future research, this could be overcome by a
sampling strategy that recruited equal proportions of women who do and do
not offer anticipatory accounts. The significance of truncated accounts also
bears further investigation. It is possible, as I have suggested, that given
different interactional conditions, at least some of the five women offering
such accounts would have worked these up into more elaborated anticipatory
accounts. Similarly, purposive sampling would allow one to tease out more
fully the relationship between occupational class and anticipatory accounting.
These are just a few of the ways in which renewed attention to the anticipatory
aspects of Mills’s original program for the sociological investigation of motive
talk could enhance our understanding of the links between what people say
and what they do.
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NOTES
1The Family Health Services Authority was the U.K. government body
responsible for the delivery of primary health care services to the whole
population at the time of the study.
2The women were also invited to identify up to two “significant others”
who they anticipated would be involved importantly in decisions about how
their babies would be fed. These significant others were interviewed on two
occasions, once before the babies were born and eight months after the births.
However, I do not draw on these data are not drawn in this article.
3This reflects U.K. government advice at the time the study was carried
out. In May 2003 this advice was modified; mothers were advised to continue
exclusive breastfeeding until their babies were six months old. In the United
States mothers are urged to practice exclusive breastfeeding for at least six
months (American Academy of Pediatrics 1997). Guidelines from the
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council emphasize the
“unequalled value of breast milk as the sole food for infants for the first 4–6
months of life” (National Health and Medical Research Council 1995:3).
4This is not to suggest that breastfeeding is never treated as a
potentially untoward act. As I have shown elsewhere (Murphy 1999), while
mothers who breastfeed do not appear to feel called to defend this practice in
relation to its effect on the baby, they do treat the possible impact on the
babies’ fathers and the potential embarrassment of onlookers as accountable
matters.
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5In many countries women’s ability to sustain breastfeeding may be
compromised by the need to return to paid employment shortly after the
babies’ birth. However, in the United Kingdom this is less likely to be an
immediate pressure. Almost all women who are employed or self-employed
before the birth of their babies are entitled to either Statutory Maternity Pay
from their employers or Maternity Allowance from the state. Both are payable
for up to eighteen weeks. Therefore, it is unusual for women to return to work
for financial reasons during the four-month period when exclusive
breastfeeding is recommended.
6Data extracts are followed by an indication of the occupational class
grouping (highest/intermediate/lowest) to which each woman belonged and
whether she was in the older or younger subdivision of that grouping. See
Table 1 for details of the age and occupational class of informants. The names
attached to the data extracts are pseudonyms.
7This reference to the baby’s father highlights the relative absence of
references to the babies’ fathers from the women’s accounts. This may reflect
the individualizing tendencies of contemporary constructions of mothering.
Hays (1996) argues that one of the features of intensive mothering is the
primacy accorded to individual mothers in child rearing and the devolution to
them of both responsibility for the child and the practical tasks associated with
caring for them.
